The Salience of European Integration to Party Competition:

Western and Eastern Europe Compared

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This article seeks to contribute to the burgeoning literature on how parties assign salience to their issue stances. With regard to European integration, recent research has pointed not only to growing public Euro-scepticism but also to an increase in the importance that the public assigns to European issues. But are parties matching this shift with appropriate salience shifts of their own? The existing literature points to important constraints on parties achieving such salience representation that arise from the nature of inherited issue ownership and the nature of political cleavages. There are also reasons to expect important differences between Western European and Central European parties in the extent to which such constraints apply. We investigate these issues using data from expert surveys conducted in twenty-four European countries at two time points, 2007–2008 and 2013, that provide measures of the salience of European integration to parties along with other indicators that are used as predictors of salience. The results do not suggest that CEE parties assign salience in ways that differ substantially from their counterparts in Western Europe. What matters most in both regions is the position that parties adopt on the issues, with parties at the extremes on the European dimension being the ones to make the issue most salient in their appeals. We also note that some predicted determinants of issue salience, such as government status, electoral support and time spent in office, and party organization, are dogs that do not bark in both regions.

Keywords: *political parties; European integration; salience; Eastern Europe; Western Europe*

Introduction

There is already a vast literature on the positions that political parties adopt on a range of political issues and dimensions and on why different sorts of parties take the stances that they do,[1] which include comparisons between Western and Eastern Europe.[2] More recently, increasing attention has been brought to the subject of the salience that parties attach to their policies and what accounts for this.[3] It is to this developing salience literature that this article seeks to contribute by considering the character and value of some theorized determinants of the issue salience of European integration comparatively in Central Eastern and Western Europe. This is a question that we regard as important not least because the salience that parties attach to issues is to date an under-studied aspect of political representation. To represent voters, we argue, parties must not only present them with appropriate policies but also with policies that are appropriately prioritised and that allow voters to make informed and reasonable choices. So, while the salience literature says much about how and why parties strategize the salience they attach to issues, it says less about what the representational consequences of these choices are for citizens and politics more broadly.

At the same time, interest in the stances that European parties take on the issue of European integration[4] has been growing in recent years in the wake of the recent euro and financial crises with their attendant political consequences and in the aftermath of the 2014 European parliamentary elections in which Eurosceptic parties made considerable advances. The second task of this article then is to contribute to greater understanding of the salience that parties attach to European integration issues.

Finally, we turn our attention to a central concern of comparative post-Communist studies, namely, the extent to which the party systems of Central and Eastern Europe (by which for these purposes we mean the CEE states of the European Union) are coming to resemble those found in Western Europe. The literature on this subject is ambivalent, though we have found numerous important ways in which they continue to differ (see also the other contributions to this volume).

The intersection of these three central concerns might be summed up as follows. First, political parties, it is argued, make salient issues on which they might be expected to do well, shaped of course by the importance that publics assign to questions but also at the party level by (1) the nature of issue ownership, where some parties and/or kinds of parties are positively associated with certain kinds of questions; (2) strategic concerns to stand out on at least some dimensions, that is, directional theories of voting;[5] and (3) the inherited characteristics of the party cleavage structure; that is, mainstream parties are almost by definition those that have historically achieved success on the issues that have historically dominated electoral competition and thus should have incentives to continue to emphasise such issues, while niche, marginal, or challenger parties should have incentives to make new and cross-cutting issues salient. The aim of a party therefore is not just to offer voters alternatives on policies but to compete by making the election in the public's mind about

those issues that most advantage a party and/or most disadvantage its opponents. Of course, as a corollary, parties also operate under constraints in their ability to make issues salient, not only including public priorities but also their inherited reputations, the strategies of other parties, and their own internal organisational structures. But it is normatively desirable that party systems as a whole offer voters choices about the issues that are most salient to them, and this choice may be hindered if voters are forced to choose only from the menu of niche or challenger parties.

Second, in the case of European integration, most of the literature points to its secondary nature in domestic party competition and to the fact that it is indeed a crosscutting issue that fits poorly into the main lines of political cleavage.[6] The issue of integration, and particularly opposition to it, therefore, has largely been left to niche and challenger parties who wish to make it most salient, especially in a time of growing public Euroscepticism. As an issue, therefore, if it becomes more salient to the public and to party competition, European integration may disadvantage mainstream parties that in general have been highly supportive of the integration process and thus have reputational legacies to deal with, leading them to downplay its importance in their appeals. This is precisely the representational concern just raised above, where only niche parties make the issue salient, but one that the question of European integration appears to raise most acutely at present.

Third, however, the issue of European integration into CEE party politics adds an additional complexity to the question. On the one hand, the permissive consensus around integration into the European Union was sustained until relatively recently in CEE politics,[7] and the rise of significant Euroscepticism has come only subsequent to accession. This may dampen the salience of European issues in party competition in general. On the other hand, there is good evidence that the European question is less crosscutting in CEE states than is the case in Western Europe, and that in post-Communist politics there (still) exists a uni-dimensional political landscape in which pro-market/pro-democracy, and pro-Europe positions are pitted against anti-market/anti-democratic, and anti-European stances.[8] In these circumstances, mainstream parties may already have competed and won by making integration salient to their appeals, and the stage is not therefore left only to niche and challenger parties. In a sense, therefore, CEE party systems may with regard to European integration be at a representational advantage over the WE counterparts.

The rest of the paper then is devoted to investigating the salience of European integration to party stances in Western and Eastern Europe. To do this, we use two expert surveys conducted by us—one conducted in 2007–2008 before the financial crisis and a second in 2013—that provide measures of the integration and domestic stances of all significant political parties in twenty-four EU member-states.[9] By 2013, when we conducted the second expert survey in the same twenty-four countries using an identical questionnaire, policy makers had begun to discuss issues like sovereign debt, the banking crisis, bond purchases, and austerity programs—terms that now are all too familiar to most citizens and that are signals of the growing relevance of European integration

that we might expect to find reflected in the importance they attach to these issues in their public appeals. This, in short, constitutes our two-wave panel of party positions in Europe, with 186 parties covered in 2008 (72 in CEE and 114 in WE) and 178 parties included in 2013 (70 and 108 in CEE and WE, respectively).

The article proceeds as follows. First, we develop further the theoretical underpinnings to expectations and hypotheses about the salience of European integration. Second, we present the results of our analysis of data from the expert surveys. We then conclude by summing up what the comparison of CEE and WE parties adds to our understanding of the drivers of the salience of integration and to our understanding of political representation.

Why Would Parties Make European Integration Salient in Their Electoral Appeals?

The existing literature points to several factors that drive the salience of issues to party appeals. These may be divided between structural factors—for example, the nature of existing political cleavages,[10] the characteristics of party organisation, and the governing status of parties[11]—and political agency, in particular the use of issue entrepreneurship and other strategies used by parties to make headway in the electoral market.[12] Of course, parties must also respond to unforeseen issues—as Harold Macmillan is famously quoted as saying in response to a journalist on what drives government agendas, "events dear boy, events." Ultimately, also, they are constrained by their understanding of the priorities that the public itself assigns.[13] We expect parties also to engage in constrained learning on how to pitch the salience of their appeals on specific issues, and in particular that they may be more inclined to change the salience that they assign to issues in response to political losses and to be more conservative with regard to salience when they have been electorally successful.[14]

Political cleavages may be defined as "strongly structured and persistent lines of salient social and ideological division among politically important actors."[15] In line with Lipset and Rokkan's classic work,[16] the characteristics of the party system are crystallised at certain points in time around the most salient political issues on which voters and successful parties align their issue preferences. Exactly what makes an issue initially most salient is for Lipset and Rokkan both structural—industry develops in all European societies and thus creates the strong likelihood of political divisions over economic class—and conjectural—the timing of initial openings to democratic party competition varies and other important issues such as state boundaries may at that point be strongly contested politically. Once established, however, various mechanisms work to keep these initial party alignments in place: parties acquire reputations with the public for the stances they take on issues and come to "own" them in the public mind; institutions (electoral laws, party finance, access to public fora) may emerge and laws and policies adopted that by shaping public

interests may make it more likely for successful parties to continue to dominate the electoral market and for the issues that they own to continue to be the most salient. What is important here is that the success of parties at time t both breeds opportunities for them to entrench what was initially salient in the public mind and in their electoral appeals, and therefore to keep out challenger parties, and erects obstacles to successful mainstream parties adjusting their positions when new issues arise at time t^1. The corollary of the obstacles faced by mainstream parties is the opportunity that new issues provide to challenger parties to establish ownership of such issues by making them strongly salient or, even as some argue to be the characteristic of niche parties,[17] exclusively salient—to their electoral appeals.

The context of structure and agency just outlined brings together, as it should, two facets of the determinants of issue salience—the position that a party takes on an issue and the importance that it assigns to it. We may consider issue positions in the context of the programmatic structure of party competition, by which we mean the ways in which various issues are packaged together—in ideological groups (e.g., social-democratic, Christian-democratic, liberal party families) or along an ideological dimension of left–right. But whereas considering a "normally" distributed set of voter preferences on the left–right scales would give rise to the expectation that successful parties should be found at or near the median voter, expectations are somewhat different when thinking of the stances that parties should take based on their ideological family and the ownership of issues that entails. From this perspective, parties should be known for the clear stances that they take on some issues—for example, economically liberal parties should take distinct positions on reducing taxes, conservative ones should support traditional social values, and social-democratic ones should support welfare and equitable distribution. And not only should these parties adopt clear positions, they should make these issues most central to their appeals.[18] As Rovny argues, "Outlying parties are expected to be more invested in the issues they stand out on."[19] When parties compete over the economy, therefore, they will do so not just by offering alternative positions on the same issue but rather by seeking to make most salient that part of the economic issue which best matches their parties' reputational profile. The corollary of the clarity expectation, of course, is that on issues that the party does not own or on which it is reputationally challenged, there is an incentive to muddy the waters on their issue stance and consequent salience.[20]

How then does the issue of European integration fit into this framework? We begin by considering Western Europe. In this region, European integration takes place in a system of more or less stable party alignments and with relatively low levels of party and public salience. At least until recently, it was a "secondary issue," often regarded as part of a broad "permissive consensus" supported by large proportions of publics and elites,[21] and where disagreements or lack of consensus did appear, crucially, it internally divided ideological camps rather than acted as a consistent, if weak, division between camps. At least some of this may have been the result of the ambiguous or arguably consensus nature of EU policies and institutions themselves, which

despite being framed by some critics as simply supportive of neo-liberal market solutions also offered social protection and a focus on human rights agendas that appealed to social-democratic and social liberal constituencies as well. Perhaps most important of all, of course, is the long memory of WWII as a dampener on nationalist opposition that is supported by a largely intergovernmental EU governance framework that supports ongoing claims to the primacy of national sovereignty. Thus, European issues figured only spasmodically in party competition and did not fundamentally disturb or disrupt the main lines of political cleavage.

In recent years, of course, and perhaps particularly since the expansion of EU competencies and the limitations on national vetoes on decision making—which galvanised national opposition to the Lisbon Treaty which, in some countries, national elites appeared to ride roughshod over further fanning opposition—and since the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 interacted with the problems of sovereign debt in conditions of a shared currency in non-aligned economies—there has been evidence of strongly growing Euroscepticism at the public level. Thus, the permissive consensus has weakened over the past two decades as the influence of the EU on national policies has grown,[22] nations' autonomy has become more restricted,[23] and citizens increasingly debate European integration in national elections.[24] As a result, beginning with the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, public support for integration in Western Europe has been declining at a precipitous rate.[25]

The position of European integration in the politics of Central and Eastern Europe was, of course, different in a number of important ways. First, from our perspective, integration emerges as an issue at the very commencement of CEE party systems in the early 1990s, where the "return to Europe" played a central ideological role in the region as a way of breaking with the Communist past and indeed of recovering and defending national sovereignty from Soviet and Russian influence. In that sense, support for integration was one part of a broader ideological package that included economic liberalism, democratic values, and social liberalism and which pitted itself against an ideological opposition that was anti-market, anti-democratic, and illiberal. It was thus not a new issue that crosscut existing divisions but a constitutive element, and arguably strongly salient part, of the main political cleavage. Second, however, having experienced a "permissive consensus" of their own arising from the imperatives of accession, including agreement to incorporate the body of European law (the "acquis communautaire") into national law, public dissatisfaction was often felt regarding the weak role of national institutions such as parliaments that may have contributed to growing Euroscepticism after accession was attained. Third, in at least some countries in Central and Eastern Europe—notably Hungary under Orban—dissatisfaction with what are seen as the failures of neo-liberalism has given rise to a return of ethnic nationalism that counterposes itself to the liberalism of the European Union. We have therefore also seen significant growth in levels of public Euroscepticism in CEE states also.[26]

All told, therefore, our study joins a growing chorus of analysts[27] that sees European integration issues becoming increasingly important in domestic politics in Europe. But what, then, are the implications of rising public Euroscepticism for the

salience of integration issues in party competition? And are they different in CEE states as compared to WE? So far as parties should represent citizens' preferences, then we should expect them both to change their positions on integration to reflect greater public opposition and to make their stances on integration more salient to their appeals. At the same time, as we have noted above, there are numerous constraints on at least some political parties shifting their stances and the salience thereof, and there may be regional differences in how they do so.

First, we consider what may be common to party salience positioning across Europe as a whole. Here, theoretical expectations point to the distinctiveness of party positioning on the salience attached to an issue. Specifically, (hypothesis 1) those parties that take *distinctive positions on the issue should make it most salient* in their appeals. At the same time, (hypothesis 2) parties that are *incumbents in government or that have had extensive periods in government* during the time in which integration has been pursued may, in the face of the reputational difficulties of distancing themselves from increasingly unpopular views of integration, *may seek to make their position on the issue less salient*—to muddy the waters.

Second, our expectations may differ in some ways for Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, in WE states, the nature of the established cleavage structure leads us to question the capacity of mainstream parties to represent citizens on an important issue that crosscuts economically based divisions in party systems.[28] As a consequence, mainstream parties in WE face incentives to maintain the salience of their economic positions[29] and to stay away from competing over European integration. Western Europe, therefore, may follow the expectations in much of the literature that see (hypothesis 3) integration issues taken up mainly by *niche or challenger parties who will be more likely to make the issue salient* in their appeals, or for whom in fact Europe may be one of the only issues that the party has a clear position on. In Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, we might expect integration to be made salient (hypothesis 4) *by a broader range of parties on both sides of the main line of political cleavage*, since stances on Europe are more likely to be connected with stances on other important political issues.

We now turn to the data and analysis that allows us to test these hypotheses.

Data and Measurement

We use two expert surveys conducted in twenty-four European nations in 2008 and 2013 that cover all EU member-states as of January 1, 2013 (except Cyprus, Croatia, Luxembourg, and Malta). Given the significant number of small parties that exist in many party systems, we use two criteria to determine their inclusion in this study: (1) they are represented in a national parliament and (2) they received at least 2 percent of the national vote in the last election.[30] Overall, the 2013 (2008) CEE survey covers 71 (72) parties in ten EU member-states in CEE; and the WE survey covers 108 (114) parties. We thus analyze the programmatic stances of 179 (186)

parties in twenty-four nations. Appendix A lists the parties and countries included in the 2013 and 2008 surveys, along with the number of experts for each country.

We recruited experts on the basis of a master list that contains scholars we identified as having published a peer-reviewed article or book on her party system in the past ten years. Our search generated a list of names with more than one thousand experts for Europe. This procedure assures us that we include respondents who feel comfortable with the long questionnaire. For each country, we aimed to have ten completed questionnaires. Although there is no absolute minimum an expert survey ought to achieve, Huber and Inglehart recommend a minimum number of five experts,[31] a conclusion that was more recently supported by Gabel and Huber.[32] Happily, we exceeded the minimum in every country, and often came close to meeting our goal of ten respondents (see Appendix A). Extensive validation analyses show that our surveys produce empirical patterns that closely match those generated by other data sources.[33]

We measure support for integration in the analysis that follows by asking respondents about the stance a party takes on European integration:

- First, what about the parties' **position** on integration with Europe? Response categories are 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly supportive).

We then followed that question with another that measures integration salience:

- And how **important** an issue is issue of integration in how a party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven-point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all.

Further analysis (not shown here but available on request) was then conducted using measures that tapped into other aspects of European integration, including political integration (regardless of whether it takes federalist or inter-governmentalist forms) and economic integration. The relationship among the general, political, and economic integration measures was in all cases very high (Cronbach's alpha in all regions and years >.80), and the pattern of results in all analyses exactly matched those reported below. For simplicity's sake, therefore, we present only the analysis that pertains to the general integration measure. All measures are presented in Appendix B.

Results and Analysis

Given our theoretical concerns, we first consider the relationship between stances that parties take on integration and the salience that parties attach to it.[34] In short, we expect that parties that choose to make integration most salient to their electoral appeal will be those that also take the clearest stance on the issue. We treat party family as a measure of ideological type and thus have expectations of what kinds of parties are most likely to be associated with pro and anti-integration stances. Parties that stand out both by the position and salience they attach to integration, however, may

not be those that would stand out on the extremes of a left–right scale but should be those for whom integration is ideologically and reputationally appropriate. But that appropriateness may differ between East and West given differences in party system legacies. Thus, given opposition to neo-liberalism, we expect communist and social-ists to be opposed; given opposition to loss of national sovereignty, we expect nation-alist parties also to be opposed. On the other side, given the social dimension of the EU, social-democratic parties may be supportive and given the single market, liberal parties may also be supportive. Nonetheless, there may also be differences to be observed between East and West, which may be the result of differences in the cleav-age structures or because party family does not adapt well to the CEE context.

Table 1 presents mean issue position and the mean issue salience by party family in both CEE and WE states in 2007–2008 and again in 2013.[35] The scores on both the posi-tional and the salience measures range from 1 (strongly oppose integration/little salience) to 7 (strongly support integration/high salience). Considering party stances first, support is on average higher in both years in CEE states than in the West, though in both regions average support falls over the two time points. The party mean at both times, however, is somewhat higher than the scale mean. As we can see, those parties that are most opposed and in favour broadly correspond to expectations. In both East and West, the strongest opposition comes from Communist and nationalist parties and support comes from Liberals and Social-Democrats. Turning next to the salience that parties attach to integra-tion, there is some prima facie support for the expectation that it is parties that adopt distinctive integration positions that are most likely to make the issue salient. This is particularly the case in CEE states, where Communists and (especially in 2013) national-ists make the issue relatively most salient as do social-democrats and liberals. In the West, however, the picture is slightly different since the most distinctive parties in terms of salience appear to be those with the most negative issue stances—again, Communists and nationalists—while other parties including those who in positional terms are most supportive of integration tend to be more closely bunched by salience. It is interesting as well to see which kinds of parties have increased the salience of integration issues over time: in East and West alike, this is seen most clearly with Communist and nationalist parties. However, other parties have shown a clear reduction in the salience of integration to their appeals: in the East, this applies to all parties that we would have positioned on the pro-market/democratic/European side of the main political cleavage—Social-Democrats, Centrists, Liberals, Christian-democrats and Conservatives; in the West, there is much more stability among parties other than the Communist and nationalists, including those that were pro-European in their integration policy stances.

To test the relationship between issue stance and issue salience more rigorously, we turn next to a series of multivariate estimates for each region at each time point that includes other variables of theoretical interest: electoral support, which allows us to see whether it is only minor parties that choose to make integration issues salient; governing status, operationalised as the proportion of time in the post-war period or since the democratic transition that a party has been part of government— intended to allow us to estimate whether reputational obstacles to a party from

Table 1
Mean Issue Position and Issue Salience by Party Family 2008 and 2013

	Central and Eastern Europe		Western Europe	
	Position	Salience	Position	Salience
Communists				
2008	**3.1000**	**4.1000**	**2.4850**	*4.8839*
2013	**2.4444**	**4.6667**	**2.0972**	*5.6746*
Socialists				
2008	4.4000	**4.0500**	3.1139	4.6245
2013	3.2500	**3.8750**	3.2339	4.7199
Greens				
2008	5.0444	4.2917	4.2537	4.1425
2013	5.0218	4.4163	5.0758	4.3422
Social Democrats				
2008	*5.7662*	*5.2139*	*5.4854*	4.5888
2013	*5.8824*	4.8606	*5.4784*	4.5095
Centrist				
2008	5.3333	4.0556	—	—
2013	4.9375	3.1375	*5.7375*	4.4646
Liberal				
2008	*5.9882*	*5.4539*	*5.4600*	4.6920
2013	5.2228	4.7875	*5.4744*	4.7608
Christian Democrats				
2008	5.4484	4.8882	4.9661	4.3874
2013	5.4497	4.6477	4.6280	4.1911
Conservatives				
2008	5.3263	5.1387	4.9551	4.8080
2013	4.8663	4.9667	4.7815	4.8896
Nationalists				
2008	**3.0965**	4.4250	**3.0083**	*4.6648*
2013	**2.3249**	*5.1827*	**2.2743**	*5.0798*
n	70	69	113	109

Note: Scale: low = 1 to high = 7. Parties at the lowest point from the mean are in bold; parties at the highest point from the mean are in bold *italics*.

having held office when integration was progressing might reduce its willingness to make integration salient to its appeals; and, finally, a measure of party organisation which we take to be an indicator of whether parties may be constrained by their members, apparatus, and social linkages to make EU issue more salient. Because a range of country-level effects may also be at work (not considered in this article), we also include country-level fixed effects in each of the models. Because we have a theoretical expectation, finally, that it is extremes of position on European integration that drives the salience attached to it, we include both the party stance and a

Table 2
Regression of Salience of European Integration onto Party Position, Government Status, Government History of Incumbency, Electoral Support and Mass Party Organisation, Plus Country Fixed Effects (Not Shown): Central and Eastern Europe

	2007	2013
Position on integration	–2.04 (.35)***	–2.20 (.29)***
Squared position on integration	.25 (.04)***	.26 (.03)***
Incumbent	–.10 (.15)	.01 (.15)
Proportion of time in government	.53 (.34)	.00 (.42)
Electoral support	.01 (.01)	–.00 (.01)
Mass party organization	.10 (.12)	.12 (.11)
n	70	69
Adjusted r^2	.68	.67

Note: Unstandardised betas (standard errors are in parentheses).
***$p < .001$.

squared term for integration stance that captures the possibility that the relationship is curvilinear. The model we estimate in each year and region therefore is:

Party Salience of EU integration$_i$ = β_0 + $\beta_1$integration position + $\beta_2$position^2 + β_3ElectoralSuccess + β_{4I}Incumbency in government + $\beta_5$party organization + β_6Party experience in office over time + β_7CountryDummies + e_i

We consider first CEE states in 2007 and 2013. In both years, only the issue predictors are of significance—see Tables 2. Contrary to expectations in the salience literatures on Western Europe, controlling for where parties stand on integration, smaller parties are not more likely to make the issue salient and neither has the rise of public Euroscepticism driven such parties to make the issue more salient over time. Similarly, we find no effect for historical involvement in governments that may have pursued integrationist policies or for current governing status. And, finally, there is also no effect—or change in effect over time—for party organisation. Overall, the models—in which country differences are not notably strong—have strong predictive value: adjusted r^2 = .68 in 2007 and .67 in 2013, with bulk of the explanatory power being provided by the positional indicators.

The curvilinear relationship between issue stance on integration and issue salience by parties in CEE states is confirmed by Figures 1 and 2 that plot the predicted marginal effects (with 95 percent confidence intervals) net of all other predictors in the model of a shift in the position of a party on the 7-point integration scale on the salience it accords it on the 7-point salience scale. The wider confidence intervals on the left side of the figure (anti-EU integration) result from

Table 3
Regression of Salience of European Integration onto Party Position, Government Status, Government History of Incumbency, Electoral Support and Mass Party Organisation, Plus Country Fixed Effects (Not Shown): Western Europe

|	2008	2013
Position on integration	−1.85 (.18)***	−1.9 (.18)***
Squared position on integration	.22 (.02)***	.23 (.02)***
Incumbent	−.00 (.12)	.12 (.13)
Proportion of time in government	.25 (.26)	−.13 (.28)
Electoral support	−.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Mass party organization	.04 (.08)	.08 (.08)
n	113	107
Adjusted r^2	.70	.76

Note: Unstandardised betas (standard errors are in parentheses).
***$p < .001$.

Figure 1
Predictive margins of position on salience 2007, Central and Eastern Europe

the smaller *n* of parties at that point in the distribution. Nonetheless, there is a clear shift in the mean prediction along the scale, from just over 4 in salience at

Figure 2
Predictive margins of position on salience 2013, Central and Eastern Europe

the centre to more than 6 on both extremes in both years. In short, how much importance a party places on integration depends on whether it adopts a distinctive stance on the issue. Other expected factors indicated by the literature do not appear to have an impact on CEE states.

Does this picture also hold in Western Europe, where the literature certainly has some quite distinct predictions? Results of the same models are shown in Tables 3 and Figures 3 and 4. The results are quite surprising given theoretical expectations and indicate that parties in WE states appear to make integration salient in more or less the same way that they do in CEE. It is issue position again that is strongly and significantly connected with issue salience, in the same curvilinear manner and to a broadly similar degree. The other predictors are dogs that largely do not bark: controlling for issue stance, incumbency, prior history of incumbency, and mass party organisation do not stimulate or reduce the propensity of West European parties to make integration salient. While there may be some sign that levels of electoral support in 2013 is associated at ($p < .10$) with greater salience to EU integration, this is not a straw to be grasped to save existing theory, since the positive direction of the effect suggests that it is more popular parties rather than smaller challenger ones that focus more attention on integration. Overall, again, the models have strong predictive value: adjusted r^2 = .70 in 2007 and .76 in 2013, with bulk of the explanatory power being provided by the positional indicators.

Figure 3
**Predictive margins of position on salience 2007, Western Europe**

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

Linear Prediction vs *West Integration: 1 Oppose 7 Support*

Figure 4
Predictive margins of position on salience 2013, Western Europe

Predictive Margins with 95% CIs

Linear Prediction vs *West Integration: 1 Oppose 7 Support*

Conclusions

This paper has sought to engage three strands of literature: on the nature and determinants of salience; on European integration and its salience to party competition; and on East–West differences in the nature of party competitions. Moreover, though we have not tested this directly here, we had the further aim to extend consideration of the role of salience to the question of party representation.

Our results raise almost as many questions as they settle. We find that the salience parties attach to the issue of European integration is most strongly linked to the stance it takes on integration—indeed, in the models we present *only* issue stance shows a significant connection to salience. This is in line with expectations in the broader literature; in that sense, the salience of European integration behaves no differently from other issue dimensions. But contrary to some expectations[36] that a "secondary" issue like European integration would be the preserve in salience terms of niche and single-issue parties, we find that it is exactly those parties that in their ideological profiles we would expect to make EU issues salient that do—Communists and nationalists at one extreme, Social-Democrats and liberals at the other. In other words, we find parties of various types that prioritise integration in their appeals, in both Central and Eastern and Western Europe.

There are, however, some dogs that do not bark and about which further research is required to establish more clearly why not. First, there is a puzzle about why factors such as government status in 2007–2008 or in 2013 or having experienced significant time in office over the years—and therefore being associated in the minds of an increasingly Eurosceptic public—appear not to be associated with shifting salience of integration. But the work appears to be done in accounting for salience by change or stability of issue positions not incumbency. And where parties have made integration clearly more salient—as the Communists and nationalists—this has been accompanied by a corresponding shift in the issue stance of these parties as well.

Second, while we note some differences between East and West in the salience of integration—CEE parties are more broadly positive about it than their West European counterparts and also make it slightly more salient in their appeals—there appears to be no difference in the broad determinants of salience positioning. So far as integration is more integrated into the programmatic structure of CEE party competition compared to crosscutting the main line of cleavage in WE, this does not mean that only mainstream or niche parties highlight the issue in either region. At least on this issue dimension, salience works in similar ways in East and West. At the same time, we do find that it is mainly extreme parties—Communists and nationalists—that have *increased* the salience of integration appeals. In the West, those parties that have reputational ties to integration policies have remained largely stable both in their positioning on the question and on the salience that they attach to the issue. In the East, there is somewhat of a contrast in that such parties have tended both to

move to a slightly less pro-integrationist stance but at the same time to reduce the salience they attach to the issue, which could be interpreted as good evidence of the muddying that Rovny expected.[37]

What then, finally, does our analysis tell us about salience representation? Clearly, this question would be best addressed directly by comparing parties' stances to the priorities of the public—on which we intend to work further. But there is a worrying aspect to our findings: while the public becomes more sceptical of integration and the issue appears to be rising in their political priorities, pro-integration parties either choose not to follow them in policy terms or in salience (in WE states) or follow them in issue stance but do not follow them by increasing integration salience. The other side of that is that both issue representation and salience representation of rising Euroscepticism in both East and West are primarily taken up by extreme parties—Communists and nationalists. In that sense, we perceive a clear representational strain in European parties. If electorates find that it is only extreme parties that take up the importance of integration, they may well be increasingly tempted to vote for them. Indeed, this is precisely a large part of the explanation that we would provide for the relative success of such parties in the 2014 European elections.

Appendix A

Parties Included in 2008 and 2013 Surveys

Country: West	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria	SPO	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Austrian People's Party	OVP	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2013: 9	The Greens	GRUNE	Yes	Yes	Green
	Freedom Party of Austria	FPO	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Alliance for the Future of Austria	BZO	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Team Stronach	TS	No	Yes	Nationalist
Belgium	Christian-Democratic & Flemish	CDV	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2008: 10	New Flemish Alliance	N-VA	Yes	Yes	Conservative/ Separatist
2013: 8	Reform Movement	MR	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Flemish Interest	VB	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Flemish Liberals and Democrats	VLD	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Socialist Party	PS	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Socialist Party. Different	SPA	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat

Appendix A (continued)

Country: West	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
	Humanist Democratic Centre	CDH	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Ecologists	ECOLO	Yes	Yes	Green
	List Dedecker	LDD	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	The Flemish Greens	GROEN	Yes	Yes	Green
	National Front	FN	Yes	No	Nationalist
Denmark	Denmark's Liberal Party	V	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2008: 9	Social Democracy	S	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2013: 9	Danish People's Party	DF	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Socialist People's Party	SF	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Conservative People's Party	KF	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Radical Liberals	RV	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Unity List—The Red-Greens	EL	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Liberal Alliance (2008: New Alliance)	NA	Yes	Yes	Conservative
Finland	Finnish Centre	KESK	Yes	Yes	Centrist
2008: 9	National Coalition Party	KOK	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 8	Finnish Social Democratic Party	SDP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Left Alliance	VAS	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Green Alliance	VIHR	Yes	Yes	Green
	Finnish Christian Democrats	KD	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Swedish People's Party in Finland	SFP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	True Finns	PS	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
France	Union for a Popular Movement	UMP	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2008: 10	Socialist Party	PS	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2013: 6	Democratic Movement	MoDem	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	French Communist Party	PCF	Yes	No	Communist
	National Front	FN	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	The Greens	VERTS	Yes	Yes	Green
	New Centre	NC	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Radical Party of the Left	PRG	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Movement for France	MPF	Yes	No	Nationalist
Merges with FDG	Communist Revolutionary League	LCR	Yes	No	Communist
	Radical Party	PR	No	Yes	Centrist
	Left Front	FDG	No	Yes	Communist
	Centrist Alliance	AC	No	Yes	Centrist

Appendix A (continued)

Country: West	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
Germany	Christian Democracy Union	CDU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2008: 10	Christian Social Union	CSU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2013: 9	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Free Democratic Party	FDP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	The Left (Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS)	DIE LINKE	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Alliance 90/The Greens	GRUNE	Yes	Yes	Green
	Piratenpartei	Piraten	No	Yes	Centrist
Greece	New Democracy	ND	Yes	Yes	Centrist
2008: 10	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2013: 9	Communist Party of Greece	KKE	Yes	Yes	Communist
	Coalition of the Left, the Movements and the Ecology	SYN	Yes	No	Socialist
	Popular Orthodox Rally	LAOS	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Coalition of the Radical Left	SYRIZA	No	Yes	Socialist
	Independent Greeks	ANEL	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Golden Dawn	XA	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Democratic Left	DIMAR	No	Yes	Socialist
Ireland		FF	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Fine Gael	FG	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Labour Party	LAB	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Sinn Fein	SF	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Green Party	GP	Yes	Yes	Green/Socialist
	Progressive Democrats	PD	Yes	No	Centrist
	Socialist	SP	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	People Before Profit Alliance	PBP	No	Yes	Communist
Italy	Left Democrats	Left_Dem	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Communist Refoundation Party	PRC	Yes	No	Communist
2013: 8	Italian Democratic Socialists	SDI	Yes	No	Social-democrat
	Italian Radicals	RI	Yes	No	Centrist
	Party of Italian Communists	PdCl	Yes	No	Communist

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

Country: West	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
	Italy of Values	IdV	Yes	No	Centrist
	Green Federation	VERDI	Yes	No	Green
	Forward Italy	FI	Yes	No	Conservative
	National Alliance	AN	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Union of Christian and Centre Democrats	UDC	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	League North	LN	Yes	Yes	Nationalist/ Separatist
	The People of Freedom	PDL	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Union of the Centre	UDC	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Five Star Movement	M5S	No	Yes	Other
	Civic Choice	SC	No	Yes	Centrist
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal	CDA	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2008: 9	Labour Party	PvdA	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2013: 9	Socialist Party	SP	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	VVD	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Freedom Party	PVV	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Green Left	GL	Yes	Yes	Green
	Christian Union	CU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Democrats 66	D66	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Party for the Animals	PvdD	Yes	Yes	Green
	List Rita Verdonk	VERDONK	Yes	No	Centrist
	Reformed Political Party	SGP	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	50 Plus	50+	No	Yes	Centrist
Portugal	Socialist Party	PS	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Social Democratic Party	PSD	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Portuguese Communist Party	PCP	Yes	Yes	Communist
	Ecological Party The Greens	PEV	Yes	No	Green
	Democratic Social Centre	CDS-PP	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Left Bloc	BE	Yes	Yes	Socialist
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	People's Party	PP	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 9	United Left	IU	Yes	Yes	Socialist

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

Country: West	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
	Initiative for Catalonia Greens	ICV	Yes	Yes	Green
	Convergence and Union of Catalonia	CiU	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Republican Left of Catalonia	ERC	Yes	No	Nationalist/ Separatist
	Basque National Party	EAJ-PNV	Yes	Yes	Nationalist/ Separatist
	Canarian Coalition	CC	Yes	No	Centrist/ Separatist
	Galician Nationalist Bloc	BNG	Yes	No	Socialist/ Separatist
	Basque Solidarity	EA	Yes	No	Nationalist/ Separatist
	Aragonese Council	CHA	Yes	No	Socialist/ Separatist
	Navarre Yes	Na-Bai	Yes	No	Nationalist/ Separatist
	Union, Progress, and Democracy	UPyD	No	Yes	Centrist
	Amaiur	AMAIUR	No	Yes	Socialist
Sweden	Social Democratic Workers' Party	SAP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Moderate Rally Party	M	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Centre Party	C	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Liberal People's Party	FP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Christian Democrats	KD	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Left Party	VP	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Environment Party The Greens	MP	Yes	Yes	Green
	Sweden Democrats	SD	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
United Kingdom	Labour Party	LAB	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Conservative Party	CON	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	Liberal Democrats	LD	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Scottish National Party	SNP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat/ Separatist
	Plaid Cymru	PC	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat/ Separatist
	UK Independence Party	UKIP	No	Yes	Nationalist

Country CEE	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Socialist Party	BSP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 11	GERB	GERB	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 7	National Movement for Stability and Progress	NDSV	Yes	No	Centrist
	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	DPS	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Union of Democratic Forces	SDS	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	National Union Attack	ATAKA	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria	DSB	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Bulgarian People's Union	BNS	Yes	No	Conservative
	Movement "Citizen's Bulgaria"	DBG	No	Yes	Centrist
Czech Republic	Civic Democratic Party	ODS	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2008: 10	Czech Social Democratic Party	CSSD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2013: 9	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	KSCM	Yes	Yes	Communist
	Christian and Democratic Union	KDU-CSL	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Green Party	SZ	Yes	Yes	Green
	Public Affairs	VV	No	Yes	Centrist
	Traditional Responsibility Party	TOP09	No	Yes	Conservative
	Party of Civic Rights	SPOZ	No	Yes	Social-democrat
Estonia	Estonian Reform Party	RF (RE)	Yes	Yes	Centrist
2008: 10	Estonian Centre Party	EK	Yes	Yes	Centrist
2013: 9	Pro Patria and Res Publica Union	IrL	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Social Democratic Party	SDE	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Estonian Greens	Er	Yes	Yes	Green
	Estonian People's Union	RL	Yes	No	Social-democratic
	Conservative People's Party	EKRE	No	Yes	Conservative
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	MSZP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 9	Fidesz—Hungarian Civic Union	FIDESZ	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 10	Union of Free Democrats	SZDSZ	Yes	No	Centrist
	Hungarian Democratic Forum	MDF	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	Christian Democratic People's Party	KDNP	Yes	No	Christian-democrat

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

Country CEE	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
	Hungarian Justice Party	MIEP	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Politics Can Be Different	LMP	No	Yes	Green
	Movement for a Better Hungary	JOBBIK	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Together 2014	Egyutt	No	Yes	Centrist
Latvia	People's Party	TP	Yes	No	Conservative
2008: 10	Union of Greens and Peasants	ZZS	Yes	Yes	Socialist
2013: 8	New Era	JL	Yes	No	Conservative
	Harmony Centre	SC	Yes	Yes	Socialist
	Latvia's First Party / Latvia's Way	LPP	Yes	No	Centrist
	Fatherland and Freedom	TB/LNNK	Yes	No	Conservative
	For Human Rights in United Latvia	PCTVL	Yes	No	Socialist
	Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party	LSdSP	Yes	No	Social-democrat
	Reform Party	RP	No	Yes	Centrist
	Unity	V	No	Yes	Conservative
	National Alliance	TB/LNNK	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Latvian Green Party	LZP	No	Yes	Green
Lithuania	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	LSDP	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 10	Fatherland Union	TS-LK	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 9	New Union—Social Liberals	NS	Yes	No	Centrist
	Order and Justice—Liberal Democrats	TiT	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Liberal's Movement of the Republic of Lithuania	LrLS	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Labour Party	DP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Liberal and Centre Union	LCS	Yes	No	Centrist
	Lithuanian Peasant Popular Union	LVLS	Yes	No	Conservative
	Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Alliance	LrA	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union	LVZS	No	Yes	Conservative
	Way of Courage	DK	No	Yes	Other
	Lithuanian Green Party	LLZP	No	Yes	Green
	Civic Democratic Party	PDP	Yes	No	Conservative

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

Country CEE	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
Poland	Law and Justice	PIS	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2008: 9	Civic Platform	PO	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 11	Democratic Left Alliance	LiD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland	SrP	Yes	No	Other
	League of Polish Families	LPr	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Polish People's Party	PSL	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	United Poland	SP	No	Yes	Nationalist
	Palikot's Movement	RP	No	Yes	Social-democrat
Romania	Social Democratic Party	PSD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
2008: 8	Democratic Liberal Party	PDL	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 10	National Liberal Party	PNL	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Great Romania Party	PRM	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Conservative Party	PC	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania	UDMR	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	New Generation Party	PNG	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Liberal Democratic Party	PLD	Yes	No	Christian-democrat
	Christian Democratic National Peasant's Party	PNTCD	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	National Initiative Party	PIN	Yes	No	Social-democrat
	New Republic Party	PNR	No	Yes	Centrist
	Civic Force	FC	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
	People's Party—Dan Diaconescu	PP-DD	No	Yes	Other
Slovakia	Christian Democratic Movement	KDH	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
2008: 10	People's Party— Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	HZDS	Yes	No	Nationalist
2013: 10	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union	SDKU	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Direction—Social Democracy	Smer	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Party of the Hungarian Coalition	MKP	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Slovak National Party	SNS	Yes	Yes	Nationalist
	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	OL'aNO	No	Yes	Conservative
	Bridge	MH	No	Yes	Centrist
	Freedom and Solidarity	SAS	No	Yes	Centrist

(continued)

Appendix A (continued)

Country CEE	Party Name in RW survey	Acronym	2008	2013	Party family
	New Majority Party	N	No	Yes	Christian-democrat
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	LDS	Yes	No	Centrist
2008: 9	Slovenian Democratic Party	SDS	Yes	Yes	Conservative
2013: 8	Social Democrats	SD	Yes	Yes	Social-democrat
	Slovenian People's Party	SLS	Yes	Yes	Conservative
	New Slovenia—Christian People's Party	NS	Yes	Yes	Christian-democrat
	Slovenian National Party	SNS	Yes	No	Nationalist
	Democratic Pensioners' Party of Slovenia	DSUS	Yes	Yes	Centrist
	Positive Slovenia	PS	No	Yes	Social-democrat
	Civic List	DL	No	Yes	Centrist

Note: 2008 and 2013 entries list the number of experts who completed a survey for a party system in a given year.

Appendix B

Measures and Indicators

The following lists the indicators used in this study even if they are presented in the main text; discussion of indicator construction is presented in the text.

EU Integration Position:

- EU Integration: "First, what about the parties' positions on integration with Europe? Response categories are 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly supportive).

EU Integration Salience:

- "And how important an issue is issue of integration in how a party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all."

EU political integration:

- How about the EU? Regardless of the specific form that integration may take, where do parties stand on creating a politically unified Europe? Do they strongly support a politically unified Europe (in which case they would score 7) or do they

strongly oppose a politically unified Europe (in which case they would score 1) or something in between?

EU political integration salience:

- And how important an issue is the formation of a Europe-wide government (regardless of the specific form) in how the party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven-point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all.

EU market integration:

- Where do the parties in [country] stand on creating a Europe-wide, integrated market for the European Union?

EU market integration salience:

- And how important an issue is the formation of a Europe-wide market in general to how the party appeals to the public? Again, we use a seven-point scale, with 7 meaning very important and 1 meaning not important at all.

Electoral success:

- Parties' popular support in the last election preceding our survey in 2008 and 2013. Coded in percent.

Governing status:

- The proportion of years since 1945 or the establishment of democracy in a country that a given party was in government.

Party organisation:

- A composite measure derived from the expert surveys that includes the strength of party members and party apparatus and the connection of the party to civil society organisations.[38]

Acknowledgments

Notes

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26. Republikon Institute, *Intensifying Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe* (Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2013), http://www.msoe.fnst.org/Reports-News/1213c27180i1p/index.html.

27. J. Thomassen and H. Schmitt, "Policy Representation," *European Journal of Political Research* 32 (1997): 165–84; Mattila and Raunio, "Drifting Further Apart"; Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, "Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism and Government Participation and Party Positions on Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51, no. 1 (2012): 17–37.

28. E.g., Kriesi, "The Role of European Integration."

29. I. Budge, "A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally," *British Journal of Political Science* 24, no. 4 (1994): 443-467.

30. It also means that a handful of very small parties, despite their parliamentary representation, were excluded from the studies. For example, we excluded several small regional parties in the United Kingdom and Spain in order to keep the survey from growing even longer as experts had to answer every question for each party. Additionally, in a few instances, a pilot study that we conducted with one expert for every country revealed that a party received very strong support in opinion surveys before a pending national election even though it did not meet the two criteria. In that case, like the Pirate party in Germany in 2013 or Egyutt in Hungary, a party was still included. However, the vast majority of parties are included on the basis of the simple fact that they meet the first and second criterion.

31. J. Huber and R. Inglehart, "Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies," *Party Politics* 1, no. 1 (1995): 73–111; Rabinowitz and Macdonald, "A Directional Theory."

32. M. Gabel and J. Huber, "Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 94–103.

33. E.g., there is a high correlation between the ideological placement of parties in expert surveys and the programmatic perceptions of parties by voters. R. J. Dalton, D. M. Farrell and I.McAllister, *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

34. For a much fuller discussion of the stances of parties on integration and its implications for party systems in Europe, including differences between WE and CEE states, see Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield, "Polarization over European Integration? The Stances of Political Parties about European Integration in Western and Eastern Europe, 2008-2013" (under review).

35. To code party families, we used information from election websites, party manifesto classifications, and occasionally contacted experts. Full details of the classification of all parties in the analysis can be found at Appendix A.

36. Meguid, "Competition between Unequals."

37. Ibid.

38. We extensively validated this indicator with Katz/Mair (1992) data. The summary indicator based on Katz/Mair data and the expert mass organization indicator are reasonably strongly linked ($r = .63$; $n = 29$), despite the fact that there is at least a 20-year time lag between both studies, and the very different modes of data collection.

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